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D I A L O G U E

The 2015 Paris Agreement on
Climate Change: Significance
and Implications for the Future
Summary
On December 12, 2015, nearly 200 countries created
a major new agreement on climate change, accompanied by national commitments to act. The Paris Agreement has rightly been celebrated as a breakthrough,
but was unquestionably constrained by the need for
compromise, and its details will continue to be developed at the international, national, and local levels. On
January 9, 2016, a panel of expert commentators and
delegation members from a variety of national jurisdictions convened at the annual American Association of
Law Schools meeting to analyze the Paris Agreement;
they considered how the agreement evolved from prior
efforts, the structure of its commitments, and its implications for the future. This Dialogue presents a transcript of the discussion, which has been edited for style,
clarity, and space considerations.
Hari Osofsky (moderator) is a Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, the Faculty Director of the
Energy Transition Lab, and Chair of the American Society of International Law’s observer delegation to the Paris
negotiations.
Lisa Benjamin is an Assistant Professor at The College of
The Bahamas.
Michael Gerrard is a Professor and Director of the Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law.
Jacqueline Peel is a Professor at the Melbourne Law School
in Australia.
David Titley is a Professor of Practice in the Department
of Meteorology at Penn State University.
Hari Osofsky: The Paris Agreement on Climate Change,1
which is often referred to as historic, represents a major step
forward in international negotiations, though I know our
panelists have varying views about how much that major
step actually translated into what is needed.2
1.
2.

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, Dec. 12, 2016, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, available at http://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/paris_agreement.pdf.
The panelists spoke on behalf of themselves individually and not on behalf of
any of the organizations they may have represented at the Paris negotiations.
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We’re going to first talk about the background to the
agreement, including the climate science background.
Next, we’ll talk about the three primary issues that really
came to a head at the end of these negotiations: namely,
the level of ambition, differentiation, and financing. Third,
we will turn to the agreement itself and analyze what it is
legally and what that means. Finally, we’re going to look at
its implications, such as long-term implementation issues
and economic transition issues.
Lisa Benjamin is an assistant professor at The College
of The Bahamas, a member of the Bahamian national
delegation to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Advanced Durban Platform (ADP) negotiations, and a member of the Compliance Committee (Facilitative Branch) of the UNFCCC.
Michael Gerrard is director of the Columbia Law School
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and worked with
the delegation of the Republic of the Marshall Islands at
the Paris Conference. The Marshall Islands’ foreign minister led the high-ambition coalition that the United States
joined. Jacqueline Peel is a professor at the Melbourne Law
School and a co-chair of the International Environmental
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. Last, but not the least, David Titley is a professor of practice in the Department of Meteorology at Penn
State University, founding director of Penn State’s Center
for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk, retired U.S.
Navy rear admiral and originator of the Navy’s Task Force
on Climate Change, and former chief operating officer for
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). David will get us underway with a little background in climate science.
David Titley: There is ample evidence that the climate is
changing. The question is why, and the answer is pretty
simple. In 1842, Joseph Fourier figured out the basic physics of greenhouse gases. These gases ensure that not all the
heat coming back out of the earth’s surface escapes into
space, but instead some is re-radiated back to the earth and
to the lower atmosphere. That’s the greenhouse effect. Parenthetically, the earth would be a frozen ice ball and uninhabitable without some greenhouse gases, but too high
a concentration of these gases causes the earth to warm
to levels not seen since before human civilization. John
Tyndall and Svante Arrhenius continued to research this
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subject in the 19th century. By 1896, the basics were very
well-known and they have withstood the test of time in the
science community. While there still are climate-related
issues to research, the basic understanding of why the
climate is changing is known very well. Sometimes, that
point gets lost, but I think that’s actually pretty important.
A seminal article in the history of change was James
Hansen’s 1981 Science article,3 where he showed that the
signal of global warming would become clearly detectable
from natural climate change by the end of the century,
with significant impacts on the polar ice sheets, global sealevel rise, and expansion of drought-prone areas in North
America and Asia. Unfortunately, Hansen’s predictions
came true. Despite the overwhelming physical evidence of
human-induced climate change, not everyone accepts this
basic science.
I addressed climate science when I recently testified
before Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) on climate change.4 You’ll
hear some people say that since 1998, there’s been no global
warming. I used a graphic at the hearing and told the senator that while I’m probably just a “simple sailor,” to me, it
looks like the global warming pause has come and gone.
Again, we know why because it’s basic, simple physics.
The question that our panel will address is, what do we do
about it?
Hari Osofsky: Continuing with the background portion
of our discussion, we turn to Jacqueline Peel, who will discuss the UNFCCC and a subset of meetings, negotiations,
and agreements that form the backdrop of how we got to
the Paris Agreement.
Jacqueline Peel: It’s important when we look at the Paris
Agreement to understand where we came from because it’s
been very much shaped by its history. We’ve been waiting
for over 20 years for this kind of agreement to come about.
The Paris Agreement is the latest evolution in the development of the international climate regime. The foundational
treaty instrument of that regime is the UNFCCC, which
was opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 and came into force in 1994.5
The UNFCCC at the international level was, as the
name suggests, intended just to set the general framework
for dealing with climate change. It had, and still has, an
objective of trying to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions
to prevent what the treaty refers to as “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. However,
that treaty didn’t do anything in terms of specifying particular actions, e.g., emissions targets that countries should
undertake to reverse and address climate change. Thus,
3.
4.

5.

James Hansen et al., Climate Impact of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, 213 Sci. 957 (Aug 28, 1981).
Magnitude of Human Impact on Earth’s Climate, Hearing Before the Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Dec. 8, 2015) (statement of
Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN (Ret.)). See http://climatecrocks.
com/2016/01/16/watch-admiral-titley-deconstruct-ted-cruz/.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, U.N.
Doc. A:AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
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since 1992, the international climate regime has been in
an almost constant state of negotiation trying to agree to
more specific standards for what countries should do. The
first round of attempts came with the Kyoto Protocol in
1997, which adopted a model that had been successfully
used in other areas of international environmental law, in
particular in dealing with the problem of ozone, and tried
to use that in the climate context.6
In the ozone context, we’ve been very successful in
reducing ozone-depleting substances by having a series
of targets that countries must meet across different timetables. Developed countries had to take the lead in terms
of reducing ozone-depleting substances, with developing
countries coming on board in a more phased manner. That
was the model for the Kyoto Protocol. Developed countries
took on targets; developing countries did not. However,
the protocol did not come into force until 2005, stalled by
the decision of the United States not to ratify the protocol.
While the Protocol eventually entered into force with the
participation of other developed countries, the U.S. nonparticipation seriously limited the scope for the Protocol to
achieve its goals of emissions reduction.
The Kyoto Protocol limped on for many years. It was
clear that a new model was needed—not the top-down
approach that the Kyoto Protocol adopted, setting targets
and requiring countries to meet those—but something different. What that something different might be began to
emerge starting about 2009 and is the basis of the approach
that we now have in the Paris Agreement. In 2009, the
conference of the parties (COP) under the UNFCCC
thought they were going to agree on a new climate agreement. This was the Copenhagen Conference that President
Barack Obama attended and where all hopes of reaching a
new agreement were dashed.
What emerged from the conference was a political declaration known as the Copenhagen Accord.7 It was a soft
political instrument, but it set the basis for what we have
now. It turned toward an approach where countries, rather
than having obligations imposed under international law
for them to reduce emissions, to achieve set targets across
given timetables, would put forward their own contribution that they are going to make to reducing emissions and
addressing the adaptation challenge.
The language of what those commitments are called
has evolved over time. We now call them nationally
determined contributions (NDCs). And from Copenhagen, there was a gradual process that recognized this
transition from the top-down model of the Kyoto Protocol to a bottom-up process. That culminated in the
Paris Agreement, which embodies the idea that countries
will put forward their own NDCs as part of the global
response to climate change.
6.
7.

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/1997/L.7Add.1, reprinted in
37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord,
Dec. 18, 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
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So, two things that drove the eventual form of the Paris
Agreement came from the history of what went before.
First, dissatisfaction with the top-down model, or at least
acceptance that it wasn’t a model that was going to work
in a climate context. Second, that it was hard to go it alone
without the United States on board. Nonparticipation
by the United States fatally wounded the Kyoto Protocol
approach. There were extra efforts made with the Paris
Agreement to accommodate the preferences of the United
States, and that agreement was very much shaped by the
need to ensure that there will be U.S. participation this
time around.
Hari Osofsky: That transitions us perfectly to Mike Gerrard, who is going to talk about the structure of NDCs.
Michael Gerrard: As Jackie said, the Paris Agreement
represented an abandonment of the top-down approach
and the adoption instead of a bottom-up approach.
Almost every country, about 96% of the emissions, came
up with self-determined pledges for what they would
do. They were all phrased in different terminology. The
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Carbon Tracker
and some others have tried to add up what those pledges
would accomplish. The U.S. commitment, for instance,
is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions against the 2005
baseline by 26-28% by 2025. Other countries phrased
their commitment in different fashions. Some of them do
it in terms of emission intensity. Some of them do it in
terms of the percentage of energy that will be provided by
renewable sources.
The pledges are completely voluntary and unenforceable, largely because, as Jackie said, the United States didn’t
want to have to submit this agreement to U.S. Senate ratification. The U.S. State Department knew that it wouldn’t
get ratified, so they were not willing to commit to anything
more than they had already committed to in signing onto
the 1992 Rio agreement. So, we have a collection of pledges
that take us to a world that is not the 2º Celsius goal or
3.6° Fahrenheit goal, but instead is well above that. Nonetheless, it is still much better than what would have been
business-as-usual. Those intended nationally determined
contributions (INDCs) are one of the central parts of the
Paris Agreement.
Hari Osofsky: Next up, Lisa Benjamin will talk about
the growing emphasis on adaptation and, in particular,
the transition into acknowledging the category of loss and
damage that has taken place over the past few years.
Lisa Benjamin: I also want to make a short note on the
whole process leading up to Paris about the INDCs and
NDCs. Even though collectively and globally it was clear
that there were obstacles to the United States signing onto
a legally binding treaty or protocol or agreement, it was
very clear before and during the Paris conference that it
was very important to the Alliance of Small Island States
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(AOSIS)8 to have legally binding commitments. Not contributions, but commitments to be housed in an annex to
the Paris Agreement, and that was the position that was
maintained for a long time. Even though the agreement
did not end up with legally binding commitments, all
parties were not very happy with what has happened in
terms of NDCs. That point leads me into the two issues of
adaptation and loss and damage (separate concepts in the
Paris Agreement), which I was able to follow in some of the
negotiations and meetings.
First, adaptation: There was a desire to have stronger
language on adaptation so that there would be a global
vision or global goal on adaptation. What that consisted of
was a movement among several negotiating blocs to have
countries submit, effectively, adaptation contributions.
So, there will be plans that are submitted on adaptation,
and the language that is included in those plans is really
up to the parties to determine, but there was a general
movement to raise adaptation to the level of mitigation to
ensure they’re considered equally, particularly with respect
to financing. Financing for adaptation was an important
issue. Financing language, for a long time, was included in
its own section as well as in other areas of the drafts, such
as in the adaptation section, and then it was consolidated
to one area on finance once people were comfortable with
the finance section.
Second, the concept of loss and damage has been
included in the Paris Agreement. That is a really significant achievement, although the novel language on loss and
damage in the agreement has been watered down significantly from what was originally submitted. The concept of
loss and damage is that which exceeds a country’s ability to
adapt. It goes beyond what you’re capable of adapting to.
It was very important, particularly for vulnerable countries
including members of the AOSIS, to have the concept of
loss and damage removed from the concept of adaptation.
It originally appeared in the Cancun Adaptation Framework9 and thus was caught under the adaptation language.
It was a real achievement to have a separate section on loss
and damage.
The original language on loss and damage that was
submitted in the intersessional meeting in September
2015 on behalf of least-developed countries included compensation for loss and damage. It included a displacement
coordination facility specifically in the agreement. What
was called for was a separate international mechanism on
loss and damage. We didn’t end up getting that. Effectively, what has been achieved in the Paris Agreement is
the Warsaw Implementation Mechanism10 plus (WIM+),
that is, the ability to expand on the mandate of the WIM
8.
9.

For more information on AOSIS, see www.aosis.org.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Adaptation
Framework, Mar. 15, 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.
10. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated With Climate Change Impacts, Jan. 31, 2015, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf.
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itself. That’s not an ideal result, but it’s better than what
some of the options were, such as no language for loss and
damage in the Paris Agreement at all. It was a hard-fought
struggle to get language on loss and damage in the Paris
Agreement itself.
What has happened, though (and this reflects the redline on the other side for a number of developed countries),
was that liability and compensation for loss and damage
was specifically excluded in the COP decision language,
so the exclusion language is not in the Paris Agreement
itself. If you look at the COP decision language, liability
and compensation is excluded for loss and damage.
Hari Osofsky: This is a helpful sequence from science to
the agreement to the NDCs to the adaptation and loss and
damage issues. I will build upon this discussion by talking
about three things: the process, inclusiveness, and shifting
multilateralism in broader geopolitical context.
The Paris Agreement builds on the lessons learned from
the difficulties faced by the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen negotiations. As Jackie noted, the Paris Agreement
was the next step in moving beyond the two-track model
represented in the Kyoto Protocol. Negotiators recognized
that there had to be a level of differentiation, but the original structure of Kyoto wasn’t working because of the countries that wouldn’t get on board. In addition, one of the
hard lessons of the Copenhagen negotiations was that the
consensus-based process by which these agreements were
made wasn’t working. A few countries were able to block
almost 300 countries. So, one of things that happened after
Copenhagen was an evolution toward what was known as
the fast gavel. The idea is that the chairs assess the room
and figure out if the level of dissent is low enough that
they can gavel in an agreement as consensus even if there is
not unanimity.11 This changing idea of the requirements of
consensus is an important part of how the Paris Agreement
was able to happen.
One of the most intriguing moments (which wasn’t that
obvious if you were watching it on television because the
cameras were showing the front of the room) was the one
following the President of the COP approving the agreement. After a few minutes of rapid corrections—which
included the change back from “shall” to “should” in Article 4 to accommodate the United States12—President Laurent Fabius looked down and said that he saw that parties
wanted to comment. He then explained that what he was
going to do was move the session from the Comité de Paris
to the final COP meeting and then allow all comments.
So, he closed up the Comité. He then opened up the COP
and immediately banged the gavel and said that the agreement is decided.
There was a moment in the back of the room that you
don’t see—maybe five seconds where people who weren’t
11. Lisa Friedman, A Near-Consensus Decision Keeps U.N. Climate Process Alive
and Moving Ahead, E&E Pub., Dec. 13, 2010.
12. John Vidal, How a “Typo” Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal, Guardian:
Env’t Blog (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal.
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in the know about what the COP president was doing were
glancing back and forth saying, “Wait, did he just. . . ?
What? He just. . . !”—and then all of a sudden, the room
exploded in a standing ovation. As it turned out, only
Nicaragua objected, making it clear that it would not block
consensus, but that it wanted to be able to comment further on why a 1.5 degree goal was crucial prior to a decision. That one country pushing back was not enough to
derail the consensus agreement or celebratory speeches by
country after country.13 So, the “fast gavel” of “almost consensus” has been a real procedural change that made a difference in Paris.
It’s also worth mentioning that something really apparent at the meetings is the concentric circles of access. When
the negotiations reach the latter stages at an important
meeting like this one, there is absolutely no access for nonparties to the meat of what is going on with the negotiations (in a less important meeting, there’s more access). Not
only that, but generally, the number of participants from
any given party allowed to be in the room during these
final stages of the Paris negotiations was limited.
What that meant was there was a very small handful of
people actually in the negotiations at that point. Other entities were influencing them by sending backchannel input.
For example, the Business and Industry NGOs (BINGOs)
were sending comments into the negotiations every time a
new draft came out, identifying changes they wanted. So,
the process involved a small set of people from each party
participating, and then another circle of the outer waiting
parties. Lisa will talk later about the difficulties those concentric circles of access cause for small delegations participating in the negotiations.
The next circle out was people who had what was known
as Blue Zone access; they were official observers. There
were thousands of people with that status. And then there
was another access circle of the thousands of people who
couldn’t even get into the complex, who were all over Paris
during these negotiations and participating in other civil
society events. There were a lot of side events going on both
inside the Blue Zone and beyond.
When I first started in academia and was writing about
the regulatory impact of climate change litigation, a senior
professor asked me, “Don’t you know climate change is
about treaties?” I think there’s been a growing recognition over the past decade that addressing climate change
is about more than just treaties. In particular, parallel to
the international negotiations among the nation states,
there has been, ever since Bali, a series of agreements and
meetings of sub-national actors, cities, and states who are
making their own agreements and commitments using
their governmental authority. At the same time, there are
numerous businesses involved. In the aftermath of Paris,
there have been over one thousand nonstate actors who’ve
made a variety of commitments around the 2-degree goal.
13. Video, Conference of the Parties, 11th Meeting, Dec. 12, 2015, http://
unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-12-12-17-26-conference-ofthe-parties-cop-11th-meeting.
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The final point I want to make is about the shifting geopolitics of the agreement. For a long time, as Lisa’s reference to
AOSIS highlights, countries have grouped themselves into
negotiating blocks at these meetings. One of the interesting shifts in the Paris negotiation was how the coalition
of ambition emerged and broke down divides among the
traditional negotiating units (even though those negotiating units still formally existed and made presentations at
the plenary sessions). You suddenly had major developed
countries working together with the small island states,
and more and more countries joining. One of the turning
points was when some of the large developing countries
from the Group of 77 (G-77), which represents a diverse set
of developing countries,14 came in as well; Brazil’s decision
to join the group was particularly crucial.15 That recreation
of the coalitions and the geopolitics of the meeting really
helped get the agreement done. It was particularly striking when the Venezuelan representative spoke at the end,
celebrating key women and the agreement. She was one of
the people who had been a blocker at Copenhagen. That
was a great moment, as was the United States and China
speaking back-to-back in support.16
I’m going to turn our focus now to the key negotiating
points at Paris. In particular, in the last week, it had boiled
down to three main issues: the level of ambition, differentiation among parties, and financing. The level of ambition focused on what the temperature goal would be, and
how countries would reach that goal. Regarding the second
issue, if you’re moving away to some extent from a twotrack model in which only Annex One countries (major
developed countries) have binding targets and timetables
to a more universal set of obligations, how do you differentiate? Finally, we will discuss the financing that was absolutely crucial to the developing countries for mitigation,
adaptation, and loss and damage.
Dave will talk first about one of the big debates that
happened over the goal of keeping global warming to a
2-degree Celsius increase. Midway in the conversation,
there were three options on the table: a 2-degree goal, a
1.5-degree goal, and what they eventually agreed to, which
was a 2-degree goal with an aspiration toward 1.5 degrees,
the compromise solution.
David Titley: When we talk about this 2-degree or
1.5-degree goal, probably the kindest thing you can say is
that they are shorthand. An analogy might be, if you work
in the Arctic, your whole Arctic program gets boiled down
to how many ice breakers you have. What makes the shorthand attractive is that it’s something people can grasp; it’s
something that you can more or less measure and you can
more or less track.
14. UNFCCC, Party Groupings, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php.
15. Joel Kirkland & Jean Chemnick, Brazil Breaks From Longtime Group: Joins
“Ambition” Coalition, Greenwire, Dec. 11, 2015, http://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060029407.
16. Video, Conference of the Parties, 11th Meeting, supra note 13.
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When somebody tells you 2 degrees (Celsius) is kind of
dangerous, but 1.5 degrees is okay, this is like measuring
with a micrometer and then cutting with an axe. The reality is that we don’t know exactly where these are. It’s like
a five-, six-, or seven-dimensional problem. If you’re talking about heat as heat stress, the numbers that people are
talking about, these shorthand figures are probably okay.
It’s probably a reasonable degree of confidence. We have
an idea what extreme heat would look like in a 1.5-degree
world or a 2-degree world.
But then, when you get into things like precipitation,
well, how many flash floods are going to be an issue,
because another law of basic physics is that for every degree
you warm up the lower atmosphere, it can hold more water
vapor. Periodically, all that water vapor decides it’s tired of
being a cloud and wants to become a flash flood and rain.
That triggers a whole cascading series of events.
The paradox is that while you have more rain when it
comes, it’s easier to get droughts too. And again, how many
more droughts are you going to have with a 1.5-degree or
2-degree increase in lower atmosphere temperature? We
could make some guesstimates on that. The one that’s
really hard to get to with these shorthand numbers is the
sea-level rise, and if you’re a small island country, it’s arguably one of the most important things to try to understand.
On a multi-century timescale, there are many credible
climate scientists who believe that we have already locked
in multi-meter sea-level rise. What that means in English is
10-20 feet of sea-level rise. Think about Lower Manhattan.
Think about Miami. Go through the Marshall Islands. Go
to Vanuatu, Tuvalu, name your island, a number of the
Caribbean islands. These are existential threats for those
locations. If we’ve already locked it in, then 2 degrees or
1.5 degrees isn’t really going to help. Now, the question
is, what do we do? Who caused it and who pays for it? All
those issues come to the fore.
I think almost everybody agrees that less warming is
better than more warming. There will be fewer unexpected
cascading consequences with less warming than more
warming. The risks of bad things happening are frankly
on the bad side. The biggest risk in climate change is that
we are underestimating the sensitivity and the cascading
effects. Not that we’re a bunch of Chicken Littles screaming
that the sky is falling. When you look at the science behind
the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), it’s
the consensus of a consensus of a consensus. Everybody
has worked on committees and knows what revolutionary
far-sided documents those things produce, right? That’s the
IPCC. If anything, the IPCC is more of a trailing edge
than a leading edge on climate.
The risks are that even at a 1.5- or 2-degree increase,
we’re in for a much bumpier ride than we think. But to
the point that less is better than more, I think everybody
can sign onto that. In the next section, we’re going to talk
about how you get there, because that is a huge challenge.
Understand that while we do know the basics, the specific
impacts on a given country, a given region, or a given loca-
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tion are still very complex to understand. There are multiple impacts. And while the shorthand is something that
we can try to put our hands around, let’s not fool ourselves
by believing that shorthand really encompasses all adverse
climate impacts, and that if we keep to a certain number,
life is good.
Hari Osofsky: The next panelist presentations will put
together those three key negotiating issues (level of ambition, differentiation, and financing) with the agreement
itself. I will play my usual cleanup role as moderator. Specifically, I was tasked with talking about what is legally
binding in the agreement.
Jacqueline Peel: I just want to clarify. Dave was talking
about the science behind the 1.5-degree versus 2-degree
Celsius goal. The legal context for that is the Paris Agreement. Probably one of its signature achievements is that
one of its objectives is to hold the increase in the global
average temperature to well below 2 degrees and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees
above pre-industrial levels.
Part of the reason that that’s been regarded as so important is because in the lead-up to the negotiations, 2 degrees
had been regarded as basically what we’re aiming at. Most
people had disregarded the 1.5-degree goal, except small
island states who were negotiating for it as hard as ever
because sea-level rise associated with 2 degrees warming
would pose an existential threat to those countries. So, it’s
important to realize that whatever the science is in terms
of what those temperature goals actually mean, in the legal
agreement we have a step forward in recognizing more
ambitious goals.
Mainly though, what the Paris Agreement is, beyond
the long-term temperature goal, is a process for how
countries are going to get there over time. An important
part of that process, besides setting the NDCs, is what
is known in the agreement as the global stock-taking
process. Essentially, this is a five-year cycle, a business
planning kind of model where you say this is what we’re
going to do, and everybody meets to bed down their next
NDCs two years before they are supposed to agree formally on what they’re going to do over the next cycle.
They will put their plans on the table, and then they
agree on what their NDC will be for the next cycle. And
those cycles will continue every five years into the future.
This agreement doesn’t have an endpoint, unlike previous
agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol that had definite
time frames that expired, and then the concern was, well,
what happens next?
The hope of this agreement is that, by introducing a
process where countries have to come together on a regular basis, they have to, in a transparent fashion, put on
the table the actions and contributions that they want to
make; they are assessed in light of the best available science; they’re assessed in light of equity concerns; and the
hope is that this collective process will enable countries
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to ratchet up over time what they’re doing to address climate change.
At the moment, where we’re heading in terms of temperature rise, is well above 2 degrees. We are nowhere near the
1.5-degree goal. For this to be effective, you’d have to have
a significant increase in ambition over time. But nobody
really knows whether that’s going to occur. It’s largely an
experiment and we’ll have to see whether this new model
forces countries to do more than they have in the past.
Michael Gerrard: I’ll talk about financing. In Copenhagen in 2009, the agreement was that the developed countries, beginning in the year 2020, would come up with
almost $100 billion per year for adaptation and mitigation
measures in the developing countries. There was no definition of which countries would pay how much or where it
would go. There was a lot of attention devoted to creating
the green climate fund, which, with various other financial
instruments that would take in the money and disburse it,
had very little definition of exactly where it would come
from or where it would go. This was a subject of considerable discussion in Paris, but it didn’t go a whole lot further.
If you look at the actual agreement, it said that developed countries are the donors. They’re the ones coming up
with the money intended to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025. That’s $100 billion
per year in the context of meaningful mitigation actions
in transparency and implementation. Prior to 2025, they’ll
set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of $100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities
of developing countries.
So, that’s about it. There are lots of problems with that.
One is that the $100 billion per year is too little even for
adaptation. There was a World Bank study around 2008
that talked about $100 billion per year being needed for
adaptation alone, but all the estimates since then are much
higher, particularly since it appears there’s a very good
chance we’ll blow past the 2-degree goal. With mitigation,
the definitions are so loosey-goosey that they’re depending
a lot on private money, so private money that goes to solar
and wind in developing countries counts against this goal.
The bottom line is there’s not nearly enough money
talked about here, and there’s no clarity at all on where that
money is going to come from. Had there been an attempt
in the agreement to say the United States comes up with
$30 billion per year, and Europe with such and such, it
would have all blown up, that would have been impossible.
So we, on the financing side, have an extremely loose and
vague set of commitments.
Lisa Benjamin: I’ll touch on the level of ambition, which
is really the key redline with loss and damage for AOSIS,
and a little on differentiation. Just to give you some context, about 80% of The Bahamas is less than one meter
above sea level. We’re extremely vulnerable to sea-level rise
as well as other impacts from climate change. I agree with
Jackie that the Paris Agreement is really a process-based
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agreement. There’s very little in the way of substantive obligations in terms of ambition. That’s why AOSIS always had
a redline on a global temperature goal of below 1.5 degrees.
We didn’t get “below 1.5,” and in fact, the 1.5 temperature
goal is an aspirational goal in the agreement. Additionally,
there is no obligation on countries to ensure that their collective NDCs meet the global temperature goal that’s been
established in the Paris Agreement at all, so we’re really in
a voluntary situation.
One of the stories that really hasn’t been told about the
1.5-degree goal is that it resulted from an AOSIS-led campaign that originated in the Cancun 2010 meetings to initiate what’s called the 2013-2015 scientific review, which
ended up in a structured expert dialogue (or SED) that was
tasked to review the current 2º Celsius global goal against a
1.5º temperature goal because, effectively, nobody was taking the 1.5 goal seriously at all. The mandate of the 20132015 review was to conclude in 2015, particularly so that
the Paris Agreement ADP negotiators and the COP could
take the results of the SED into account when considering
the global temperature goal.
I wasn’t able to attend the subsidiary body for implementation (SBI) and subsidiary body for scientific and
technological advice (SBSTA) plenary meetings in the
Paris negotiations, but those subsidiary bodies were tasked
with assessing the outcomes of the SED. Effectively, even
though the Durban Agreement17 says that the Ad Hoc
Working Group on the ADP has to refer the outcomes of
the SED to the COP for consideration, parties within SBI
and SBSTA refused to agree to have the SED review forwarded to the COP because they specifically did not want
the 2-degree temperature goal to be reviewed and, effectively, the level of ambition to be raised in the Paris Agreement. It was a really hard-fought struggle and I think it was
the high-ambition coalition that really broke the deadlock
on the long-term temperature goal. It was a five-year struggle to get this global temperature goal in the agreement. It’s
in there, but it’s really only a marker of the ambition gap,
and it will remain a marker of the ambition gap for years
to come.
In terms of differentiation, Article 4.4 is the one that
really sets out differentiation between developed and developing countries. Developed countries have some obligations for absolute economywide emissions reductions in
their NDCs, whereas developing countries’ obligations
are for only economywide reductions and not absolute
emission reductions. This language is better than the differentiation that had been in the agreement before, where
developing countries were saying we’re not committing to
doing anything economywide if we don’t get financing for
it. The United States has a particularly unique role in that.
AOSIS wanted everybody to commit. AOSIS didn’t want
a lot of differentiation on reduction targets because every17. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban From 28
November to 11 December 2011, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1,
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
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body has to really reduce in order to get to the temperature
goal that AOSIS was negotiating for survival. Effectively,
1.5 is a survival line for us.
Michael Gerrard: Since Article 4.4 is so important, let me
just read the words: “Developed country parties should”—
now, this word “should” is really important because the
prior draft said “shall.” Just a couple of hours before the
gavel fell, the U.S. negotiators said, wait a minute, we really
hate the word “shall” here because “shall” might require us
to go to the Senate, and we don’t want to go to the Senate.
So, the language was changed to “should.”
“Developed country parties should continue taking
the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission
reduction targets.” So, the developed countries now, as
before under the Kyoto Protocol, are the ones that need
to be leading, and they need to reduce their absolute emissions. Their emissions can’t grow. “Developing country
parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts,
and are encouraged to move over time towards economywide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of
different national circumstances.”
Now, you could count four, five, six, maybe seven weasel words in that sentence. It keeps on getting softer and
softer from the cumulative effect of all these weasel words.
So, there’s no obligation on the developing countries to
actually reduce their emissions levels, but several pledged
to moderate their growth or take other measures. As Lisa
quite rightly said, this is one of the major places where we
have differentiation continuing. We no longer have stark
Annex 1 and Annex 2. You’re not in one or the other, but
we do still have that concept built in.
Hari Osofsky: I’ve been given the task of parsing out the
question of what exactly it means that the agreement is
legally binding. A lot of it comes down to the distinction
between a treaty under international law and a treaty under
U.S. law. The Paris Agreement is structured as an annex to
a decision by the 21st COP to adopt it.18 The Paris Agreement itself is a treaty under the Vienna Convention on
Treaties and will be going through a ratification process in
April. The reason for the delay is to prepare official versions
in all of the languages.
One of the lessons learned from Kyoto was that it was
very clear to the countries of the world that they wanted
the United States on board. It was also very clear at the
negotiations that the United States, at least as represented
by the executive branch, wanted to be on board. Throughout the negotiations, not only did you have the United
States by the second week joining the high-ambition coalition, but you also had a very active U.S. center. Within the
big sprawling context of the Blue Zone, the different countries had centers that put on programs. The U.S. center had
continuous programs on climate science going on in the
background, and panels showing actions that the execu18. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, supra note 1.
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tive branch, different states, and businesses were taking to
address climate change.
It was very clear that the United States, represented by
its federal executive branch and other domestic climate
change leaders at the conference, was trying to counteract
the messages that dominated by the U.S. domestic political newsfeed, which was obviously in the backdrop of all
this. As the United States joined the high-ambition coalition, Senator Cruz was holding hearings on climate change
science and Donald Trump was talking about not letting
Muslims immigrate, et cetera. Every country went absolutely as far as it could under its political constraints to get
to this agreement. It was the most ambitious agreement
possible given the various internal political constraints facing each of the countries.
One of the things heard over and over again in the
speeches and halls was that this was not a perfect agreement, but it was a good agreement. In particular, negotiators were constrained by wanting to structure an agreement
that the United States could join. For those of you who
want to read about this issue in more depth, both David
Wirth and Dan Bodansky have written detailed analyses19
of what can be done through executive agreement rather
than through a treaty under U.S. law. Essentially, what
was being parsed at the conference was making sure that
all the language that had “shalls,” the binding language
in the binding part of the agreement that was a treaty
under the Vienna Convention on Treaties, would already
be covered by the obligations that the United States had
taken on by becoming party to the UNFCCC. All of the
“shoulds,” the suggestive but not legally binding obligations, the soft law elements of the treaty, were things that
go beyond that, either under U.S. domestic law or existing
U.S. treaty obligations, and that was to sidestep having to
seek Senate approval.
Now, there may be litigation because some members of
the Senate aren’t happy about this. But that’s essentially
legal parsing that took place in the creation of the agreement, so that it was legally binding as a matter of international law. Also, the United States is joining it as a matter
of international law, but doing so under the executive’s
authority to join international agreements rather than
under the Senate’s treaty power.
The final thing I want to mention is the human rights
provision. That was not a massive operational provision,
but it was a major point of media attention and political
contention. I think there was a fairly strong sense going
into the negotiations that it was probably going to end up
where it ended up. Most people thought that human rights
were going to get into the agreement, but only in the preambular language and not in the operational language.
There was a huge, but ultimately unsuccessful, push by a
19. David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A
Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 515 (2015); Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement (May 2015), http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.
pdf (Center for Climate Change and Energy Solutions Report).
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number of countries to try to get human rights into the
operational language. It’s not entirely clear what some of
the obligations are; there’s a mushiness to the agreement.
It’s not entirely clear what the implications would’ve been
if human rights had been included in the operational rather
than in the preambular language. Part of the reason it’s not
entirely clear is because there’s already a pretty good set
of documentation in various international agreements and
by international bodies recognizing that climate change
can have human rights implications. That’s reasonably
well-established in a number of international settings at
this point, that you can apply existing rights in a variety of
ways to climate change. So, even though the human rights
community would have preferred it in the operational language, in terms of being able to bring human rights claims
based on climate change, there’s already quite a bit there
that can probably be used.
With that, I want to turn to our final topic: Where do we
go from here? There was a moment of celebration in Paris,
a standing ovation, and country after country speaking for
hours afterwards. But the real question is now that the rubber meets the road, where are we going to take things?
David Titley: I absolutely agree with Hari and many others who have said that this is the best agreement that we
could have achieved, given every country’s internal constraints. Fundamentally, this is risk management. There
are no guarantees at any arbitrary target exactly what the
consequences will be, but we do know that the more ambitious the target or the lower the temperature, the greater
the chance that the risks will be manageable.
I’m going to use a couple of seconds to just talk about
the financing, to put Mike’s comments in scale. The Netherlands, which arguably has one of the most sophisticated
flood-control systems in the world, has estimated that it
will cost them between now and 2100 an additional €100
billion to just simply upgrade what they have. The coast of
the Netherlands is roughly equivalent to the coast of Connecticut and Massachusetts. That’s already from a really
sophisticated baseline. When thinking about Mike’s comment as to whether €100 billion is enough, keep that baseline in the back of your minds.
I’ll talk about these baselines, and I’ll talk about the
temperature part. As I’ve said, if you look at the true
pre-industrial age, you could make a pretty strong case
that we’re already today 1.2 degrees Celsius above the
true pre-industrial level. If the target is 1.5 degrees, we’re
just about there, and 2.0 degrees is very close at hand. As
professionals who are working on this, it’s good to make
sure you understand, when somebody gives a target, what
was their baseline for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
and also for temperature, because we all say “Yeah, that
makes sense,” but you could make a pretty good case that
we’re already there.
As for where do we go from here, the Paris Agreement
was the easy part. As hard as this was, it was the easy part
for us to do, compared to transforming the world’s energy
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system. It will transform anyway. The U.S. energy system
was 100% wood 250 years ago. These transformations take
typically multiple decades to a century. We need to figure
out how to move the next transformation to non-carbonbased fuels in a matter of a few decades, not a leisurely stroll
through the rest of the 21st century. That’s going to be the
big challenge, on the order of when President John F. Kennedy said go to the moon and come back safely inside of a
decade. It’s on that kind of order.
When President Kennedy said that, you could see in
the U.S. budget that the appropriation for space exploration went from $5 billion to $50 billion. Later, it came
back down again. We have yet to do anything like that
kind of magnitude in figuring out how we can transition
to different types of energy generation, energy storage,
and energy management, then use that to help the rest of
the world. That’s our challenge. It’s quite literally a moonshot-scale challenge.
Jacqueline Peel: I’d like to make three points. One is
that, as Dave said, we’ve done the easy-hard part, which
was getting an international agreement. In some sense,
we don’t need another international agreement now. We
can improve on it through decisions of the COP to the
UNFCCC to fill out the details of the Paris Agreement. It’s
an agreement that continues over time, that we can use as
a basis for international action going forward.
The real action is going to have to be at the domestic
level, because this agreement very firmly puts the obligations on countries to go through domestic processes on a
regular basis that will look at what their contribution will
be to the global response to climate change. In that respect,
I want to say a few words about the developed countries
outside the U.S. sphere. In the context of my own home
country of Australia, a rich developed country with a fossil fuel-dependent economy, I think the Paris Agreement
will be quite important in setting a long-term signal for
what needs to be done in terms of domestic energy transition. One of the arguments that’s also being put forward in
Australian policy (as it is sometimes in the United States)
is that we shouldn’t do anything while the rest of the world
is not acting. I think that argument no longer has legs after
the Paris Agreement, and that will force smaller developed
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, perhaps even
Canada, to pick up the ball and run with it a bit more on
their domestic climate change policy.
Before the Paris Agreement, a lot of us in the climate
sphere would say nothing is happening at the international
level, nothing will ever happen at the international level,
and so we have to look at all of the multidimensional
action that’s going forward on climate change, e.g., at
the state and sub-national level, by the private sector and
NGOs. Now that we have the Paris Agreement, I don’t
think we need to change that perspective very much. We
have something happening at the international level, but
it’s only going to be a small piece of the puzzle and we’ll
still be very reliant on other actors at the sub-national level,
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corporations and civil society, to forward the actions and
provide the momentum for greater ambition under this
particular agreement.
The Paris Agreement itself doesn’t speak much to those
actors, but the decision of the COP that adopted the Paris
Agreement says a lot more about the potential role of
those actors. Particularly in the private sector, what has
often been missing and has created a lot of uncertainty is
some sense of where the world is going in terms of energy
transition and whether there is international agreement
on doing something about climate change. The 1.5-degree
and 2-degree goals set clear boundaries that businesses at
least can plan for on a longer-term horizon in terms of
energy transition.
Finally, I want to speak about what’s in the preamble of
the Paris Agreement. There are a lot of concepts mentioned
in there that have never made an appearance in an international climate agreement before. They include things
like food security, ending hunger, eradicating poverty, a
just transition in the workforce and ensuring that we have
decent jobs for people, human rights and gender equality,
climate justice, public awareness, participation and education, engagement of all levels of governments and actors,
and sustainable lifestyles.
In general, what we’ve seen with the Paris Agreement
and the process leading up to it is greater recognition of
the need for integration across different international
agendas. One of the reasons is that, while we are hopeful that we can do a good job on mitigation and reduce
or even avoid the worst impacts of climate change, the
reality is that we are going to be locked into some level
of climate change and a lot of what’s going to be occurring is adaptation or dealing with loss and damage. That’s
an activity that requires not just climate experts, it also
requires disaster management experts and people who
look at the human rights aspects or the development
aspects. The Paris Agreement provides an indication of a
greater sense of integration across those different international agendas than has been evident in the past, where
the international climate regime was much more segregated from other areas of international law.
Michael Gerrard: As Jackie indicated, the principal action
in the years going forward is going to be at the domestic level, not at the international level. Each country will
undertake its implementation, its fulfillment of its pledges
in accordance with its own domestic politics. China is
working very hard to moderate its emissions, primarily because of the crisis they face is with killer air pollution in cities, as opposed to its international obligations.
In the United States, almost all of you are environmental
law professors who are all familiar with the Clean Power
Plan (CPP), the principal U.S. measure in addition to the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards to move away
from fossil fuels, and the litigation barrage that has been
launched against it, and the political barrage that has been
launched against it, and its vulnerability to the results of
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the next presidential election. All of that is very much in
play at the moment in the United States.
One provision that I want to highlight in the Paris
Agreement is Article 4, Section 1, my favorite paragraph
in the whole thing. “In order to achieve the long-term
temperature goal,” we talked about that, “parties aim to
reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon
as possible,” it doesn’t say just when, but as soon as possible,
“recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing
country parties,” again, that instance of differentiation,
“and to undertake rapid reduction thereafter in accordance
with the best available science.”
Here’s the phrase that I think is really important: “So
as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in
the second half of this century.” Now, the sinks of course
are mostly the forests and the oceans, but the amounts of
greenhouse gases that are absorbed by these sinks are really
small compared to the greenhouse gases that come from the
emissions of fossil fuel. So, the only way you can achieve an
equal amount of emissions going out and emissions being
sucked back in would be basically to eliminate the use of
fossil fuels—unless you can sequester them through carbon capturing and sequestration, which as we know is a
technology that is sort of limping along, or engage in a
massive air capture program, which is also a set of technologies that are now being developed but are nowhere near
scale, plus massive reforestation.
All these things combined could give you a little flexibility to continue emitting fossil fuels, but the numbers,
to keep within the temperature goals, don’t add up unless
you basically eliminate the use of fossil fuels. Even then,
you have to get into the era of negative emissions, meaning
you have to find some way to draw back the CO2 through
air capture of various devices that are very far away from
commercial applications.
So, we have this wonderful aspiration in the agreement,
and I think it accurately sets forth what the science says
needs to be done. I don’t know how many people have confidence that that will in fact be done, but this agreement is
a good clear articulation. It may also have domestic legal
implications in terms of securities disclosures if you’re in
the fossil fuel business, the Securities and Exchange Commission has guidance saying that there should be disclosure of international accords and their business impact,
and here we have an international accord that’s calling for
the elimination of fossil fuel use. So, if you are a fossil fuel
company, I think you have an obligation in your securities
disclosures to talk about the implications if the international accord is actually carried out.
Lisa Benjamin: I have a couple of quick points on the next
steps. First of all, the agreement has to be ratified and come
into force, and it has a double trigger of 55 parties and 55%
of global emissions. The international community is a little
gun-shy about Kyoto, but actually this all has to be ratified
by the parties before it comes into force.
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My second point is that between 2015 and 2020, there
will be the ad hoc working group on the Paris Agreement.
There’s not a lot of detail in the Paris Agreement itself. It
is fairly short, 12-13 pages, so the details of the modalities of the committees and the mechanisms that have been
established are going to have to be hammered out over the
next four years without a lot of the international spotlight
that was on the Paris negotiations. It’s going to be an uphill
battle to get all of these things agreed.
The third point I want to make is that I am not sure that
the Paris Agreement has the force it needs to really counter
existing market forces. There was language in early drafts
that suggested subsidies for fossil fuels had to be eliminated. That language didn’t make its way into the Paris
Agreement. Maybe I should be more hopeful, but I’m a
little pessimistic. There is an implementation and compliance mechanism and I was able to sit in on some of the
negotiations for that. The details of that are extremely brief,
which is what everybody anticipated because we didn’t
really know what the obligations would be in the Paris
Agreement to be able to craft a compliance mechanism.
What’s very interesting is that developing countries will
be subject to an implementation and compliance committee in the climate regime for the first time in history. In
order to help with that, the agreement establishes some
important committees. The first is the capacity-building
committee, which was argued for specifically by developing countries. The second interesting mechanism that has
been established is on transparency—a capacity-building
initiative on transparency. I think the transparency provisions are the strongest things we have in the Paris Agreement. In order to help developing countries that are not yet
subject to the extensive reporting requirements that hopefully will be submitted, that initiative was established.
I have to put in a bit of a plug for the Kyoto Protocol since
I sit on a committee underneath it. There are really useful
reporting mechanisms that have been used under the Kyoto
Protocol, including an expert review mechanism where
experts review national communications and do in-country
reviews. That is important expertise that has been built up
under the Kyoto Protocol that should be built upon in what
is essentially a process-based agreement, so there are some
important lessons that can be learned from that.
Finally, just to mirror what others have said, I think
this is really a high-stakes experiment on multilateral
cooperation, and I hope it ends up being as ambitious as
it should be.
Hari Osofsky: I’m going to wind up this third section by
touching on two issues that have not been fully covered.
The first is the U.S. INDC. The United States said that it
intends to achieve an economywide target of reducing its
greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28% below its 2005 level
in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by
28%.20 The key political issue in the United States right
20. United States—Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, United Nations Framework Convention Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/fo-
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now is how are we doing this. The United States divides
things between regulatory actions it has completed since
2009, and things it’s working on at this time.
Well, regarding the regulatory actions that it has completed, part of them involve the less controversial part
of its Massachusetts v. EPA 21 implementation—in other
words, the actions it has been taking on transportation
to reduce motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. There
was a convergence of the federal government, California, and the auto industry that resulted in the joint U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulation of
fuel efficiency and tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions.22
Moreover, car companies are ahead in meeting those
targets23 which, for the most part, are not particularly
controversial and not as subject, I think, to the 2016
presidential election outcome as the electricity side of
things (though low gas prices do not help the market for
more efficient vehicles).24
But the power plant and automobile regulations are only
a piece of the puzzle. The U.S. government has also done
some things, for example, in the building sector that we
don’t hear a lot about because they’re not as controversial,25
as well as around chlorofluorocarbons, which, of course,
are important because even though they’re a small percentage of emissions, they have a very high impact in terms of
warming potential.26
But even with these accomplishments, a key complexity for U.S. implementation involves domestic politics
over power plant regulations. In particular, an important
piece of the U.S. plan under its INDC involves these
politics—the INDC lists five things, but one of the five
things that is going to account for a good chunk of emissions are the regulations that they’re imposing on new
cus/indc_portal/items/8766.php.
21. 549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
22. EPA Reports: Automakers Beat Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Third Straight Year, Dec.16, 2015, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.
nsf/7ebdf4d0b217978b852573590040443a/bd39fd8e80dd703585257f1d
006040fe!OpenDocument.
23. John Lippert & Jeff Plungis, With $1.68-a-Gallon Gas, America’s Big MPG
Goals Are in Trouble, Bloomberg Business, Jan. 12, 2016, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-12/automakers-regulators-debatefuel-economy-as-gas-prices-fall.
24. EPA Reports: Automakers Beat Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Third Straight Year, Dec.16, 2015, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.
nsf/7ebdf4d0b217978b852573590040443a/bd39fd8e80dd703585257f1d
006040fe!OpenDocument. While opposition exists to these standards, the
controversy over them is much less than over stationary source regulation,
such as the Clean Power Plan.
25. For an example of the Obama Administration’s latest efforts under the
President’s Better Buildings Program, see Press Release, White House,
Fact Sheet: Cities, Utilities, and Businesses Commit to Unlocking Access
to Energy Data for Building Owners and Improving Energy Efficiency,
Jan. 29, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/29/
fact-sheet-cities-utilities-and-businesses-commit-unlocking-access.
26. U.S. Dept. State, The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/chemicalpollution/83007.
htm. For analyses of the Montreal Protocol’s role in addressing climate
change, see Guus J.M. Velders et al., The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting Climate, 104 PNAS 4814 (2007); Mark W. Roberts &
Peter M. Grabiel, A Window of Opportunity: Combating Climate Change by
Amending the Montreal Protocol to Regulate the Production and Consumption
of HFCs and ODS Banks, 22 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 99 (2009).
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and existing power plants, and, in particular, the controversial CPP.27
Hannah Wiseman and I have a piece coming out where
we’re looking at some of the questions around regional
implementation of the CPP.28 We hear a lot about the
domestic politics over the CPP and those will be very
influenced by the upcoming presidential election and the
outcomes of pending court cases. The hope is that there
are some industry and utility lock-ins between now and
the election.
That being said, for the most part, even states that
oppose the CPP are working toward implementation. One
of the key things is finding ways of bringing together an
environmental law regime based on cooperative federalism,
where states implement federal standards, together with an
energy law regime that is regionalized for the most part.
Our energy markets are regionalized and energy governance is largely regionalized.29
While EPA recognized this in creating interstate implementation options under the CPP, the way it designed
those options doesn’t necessarily make it easy for the ways
in which states cooperate, which everybody agrees will save
money and is good, to align with existing regional energy
markets and governance. That’s a real challenge in implementation. It’s very technical, it doesn’t make for good
sound bites, but it’s an important piece of the implementation puzzle.30
The final thing I want to address is to pick up on what
others were saying about corporate energy transition. Jackie
and I, together with my corporate law colleague, at Minnesota, have just obtained a grant from the Australian government to work on corporate energy transition. Corporate
energy transition has a lot of different pieces. There’s the
investment financing transition that needs to happen, and
there is the asset transition that needs to happen. It’s about
companies like Best Buy and Target shifting what they do,
not just about utilities and energy companies shifting what
they do, and it’s also about what is needed to help investment transition.
Something we find quite promising are the changes to
securities law going on around the sharing economy and
the promise that that might help foster more clean energy
investment. One of the topics that came up a lot with economists during the Paris negotiations in the Blue Zone event
was that when you get beyond just the developed countries and you start thinking about financing around energy
transition, it’s important to remember that a lot of that is
going to be public financing, not corporate financing. So,
some of these entities like the World Bank are playing a
key role in what our energy transition looks like moving
forward, and that transition is a key point in how close we
get to meeting the ambitions of this agreement.
27. See United States—Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, supra note
21.
28. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Regional Energy Governance of
U.S. Carbon Emissions, __ Ecol. L.Q. __ (forthcoming 2016).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Audience Member: One thing Jackie discussed that
was particularly important related to the action that’s
taking place at the local level. There are communities all
over the world that established zero-carbon programs and
objectives, including communities in European countries
and in California and New York. Action is also being taken
in the corporate world. For example, I believe Microsoft
has an internal carbon trading system; each of its divisions
is charged with paying the carbon price for its operations.
Those payments are put into a fund for energy efficiency
and renewable energy. I think that’s extraordinary. Other
corporations are following that lead.
Another thing I’m seeing is action taken by oil-producing
countries. For example, Abu Dhabi, which I believe is the
third largest oil-producing country, is doing a fabulous job
in helping developing countries in establishing renewable
energy. I have students from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sent
here to learn how to establish renewable energy companies.
Hari Osofsky: I agree that there are exciting things being
done both by sub-national governments and by corporations, and a good chunk of my scholarly work over the
past decade has focused on that and in particular on cities. There is a big challenge around cities, though, which is
that action by them has to be scaled up. So, when you look
at the number of cities making commitments, whether
it’s under the Mayors’ Agreement in the U.S. context31 or
whether it’s under the Compact of Mayors that was created
in 2014,32 you see wonderful commitments and wonderful
actions by a number of cities and sub-national actors.
But one of the challenges when you look at it globally
is that a lot of major cities are in metro regions, and there
tends to be a lot of focus on actions by center cities, but
not on those by the smaller suburbs that surround them,
and there isn’t a lot of differentiation in giving models to
different types of suburbs for how to do things. There’s
important work to be done. Something I push for in my
work on how to scale up local climate change is the need
to create models for different kinds of cities for how they
can get the win-wins and do more, because we need more
cities to do more to get us to the goal. Cities represent 70%
of global emissions, but we need more work to be done in
the suburbs also.33
Another of the challenges is that different networks have
different toolkits and different standards that cities have
to meet. So, what happens is that a city that wants to be
ambitious ends up having to waste a ton of time showing things, and then there’s the question of whether they’re
31. Mayors Climate Prot. Ctr., About the Mayors Climate Protection Center, U.S.
Conference of Mayors, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
about.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5ZZC-98KL.
32. Compact of Mayors Launched at UN Climate Summit, Int’l Inst. for
Sustainable Dev. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/
compact-of-mayors-launched-at-un-climate-summit/.
33. Hari M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography of Local Climate Action: MultiLevel Network Participation in Metropolitan Regions, 2015 Utah L. Rev.
173; Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilities for
Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 35 (2012).
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measuring and reporting using the same metrics so that
they can be compared.34 Efforts are being made to make
this better, but we’re not all the way there yet. I agree that
there are wonderful steps being taken. I’m not necessarily
doom-and-gloom, and I don’t think others are either, but
we have a long way to go. We need to celebrate Paris and
then we need to roll up our sleeves and really figure out
how we start to do the various things we need to do to scale
up to reduce the ambition gap.
Michael Gerrard: I’m a little closer to gloom-and-doom.
Yes, there’s a huge amount going on at the state and municipal levels, much of which the national governments are
taking credit for when they report on their compliance with
the INDCs. The question, as Hari says, is does it add up to
enough? We don’t necessarily have the uniform reporting
system that will allow us to quantify what the goal will add
up to. But notwithstanding all of that, The Bahamas, the
Marshall Islands, and all these other countries are in grave
danger and that will continue to be the case.
David Titley: When I talk about this, I tell people to prepare for catastrophic success. At some (probably unpredictable) point in the future, we will reach a so-called tipping
point and the public will demand action on climate change
and transforming our energy system. When that moment
arrives, we need to have policies and programs ready to
implement, as these windows of opportunity do not stay
open forever. Unfortunately, we’re not there yet. I watch
the topline metrics and they’re pretty depressing. The
topline metrics of CO2 emissions growth has been pretty
much unchanged. That curve is going to have to bend
down substantially and quickly in order to meet the 1.5
degrees Celsius goal. That’s just physics.
It’s great that we’ve run the first 100 yards of the marathon in good time, but we’ve got a long way to go. Congress
is key. As I mentioned earlier, I recently testified before the
Senate, and let me tell you, it’s La-la Land. Congress is key
because they can either be a headwind or a tailwind on this
issue. Right now, they’re a headwind. That doesn’t mean
people can’t still accomplish stuff. I personally think the
administration has done pretty well given the congressional environment, but the fact is that if we want real change
in this country, Congress has to be part of it. Right now,
they’re not part of that change. I would be much more
optimistic if they became part of it.
Audience Member: We’ve seen more public acceptance of
climate science over the past few years, but we need something we can do about it. Everybody is celebrating, “We’ve
done it,” based on headlines where we’ve got this historic
international climate change agreement. But there’s not
a word about actually changing anything in the United
States as a result of this historic agreement. Even people
who accept the climate science think that now we’re all
34. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography of Local Climate Action, supra note 33;
Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts, supra note 33.
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good because of the Paris Agreement; we’ve taken care of
the problem. So, I guess my question to you is whether the
Paris Agreement is going to turn out to be a step forward
or a step backward.
Hari Osofsky: Before we address that, I’m going to take
our last two comments because I want to make sure we
have time to hear from everybody in the audience. Then
we’ll let panelists wrap up collectively.
Audience Member: I’m curious to know more about
NGOs’ effect on the development and relative effect of the
Paris Agreement versus other treaties.
Audience Member: I’m curious whether you understood
the agreement to provide that the INDCs would become
more stringent every five years.
Michael Gerrard: I think that Paris was a step forward. It
was not a great leap forward, but I think it was a step forward to the extent we have rational argumentation going
on, although that is happening to only a limited extent
in Congress. But to the extent that we have any rational
argumentation, I think the Paris Agreement goes a long
way to take away the argument that the United States
shouldn’t have to go it alone, where we can see that China,
for example, has already taken on commitments to control
its emissions.
I mentioned the relevance of the securities disclosure.
I think the agreement is also relevant to the kinds of disclosures that need to be made under the National Environmental Policy Act.35 I think the Paris Agreement is
generally helpful and at least establishes that there is hope.
There is a possibility that it might work. I think it’s a net
mild positive.
Lisa Benjamin: I like George Monbiot’s blog entry for Dec.
15, 2015, at The Guardian’s website. He said, “By comparison to what it could’ve been, it’s a miracle. By comparison
to what it should’ve been, it’s a disaster.”36 That encapsulates the Paris Agreement for me. Unless you’re in there
trying to fight for word after word and lines of text, it’s so
difficult to understand how challenging it is to get positions agreed to because of countries’ conflicting economic
and political considerations. I’m very sympathetic with the
position that we ended up with in Paris even though it’s not
sufficient. It’s much better than it could have been.
We’ve come out of 20 years of bitter, sometimes acrimonious, climate negotiations. The atmosphere has almost
been poisonous in some of these rooms, so I think there
was a collective goodwill to get something done at Paris.
That something was not enough from my perspective, but
I think it is positive. I agree that the fanfare seemed overdone. I was a little surprised when I read the agreement
35. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370f, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
36. George Monbiot, Cop-Out, Guardian, Dec. 15, 2015, http://www.monbiot.com/2015/12/15/cop-out/.
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after all the fanfare, but I think people were just relieved
that something was actually agreed to.
Jacqueline Peel: One of the audience questions was
whether the Paris Agreement is a victim of its own success. That’s an interesting perspective, and certainly the
way it played out in the media, it did seem that the whole
problem is considered solved. An important part of sessions
like this and the academy in general in talking about the
Paris Agreement is to communicate that the international
agreement is just the start of a process that depends very
heavily on domestic actions, and that the impetus will fall
on domestic governments, legislatures, sub-national governments, and other actors to take this forward. That’s an
important message to keep repeating in respect to the Paris
Agreement, that it’s not all solved, it’s just the international
part that has achieved some progress.
There was a question about the progressive aspects of the
NDC provision. I can’t speak to the trickier question about
whether that’s outside the scope of U.S. executive authority, but the language that’s in the agreement is pretty soft.
Each party’s successive NDC will represent a progression
beyond the party’s then-current NDC and be reflective of
its highest possible ambition, reflective of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the
light of different national circumstances. That’s a provision
in Article 4.3 and you couple that with the Agreement’s
stocktaking process that says you should be doing regular
global reviews of NDCs and their adequacy, and looking at
this in the light of science and equity concerns.
You could go back to the UNFCCC in 1992 to which
the United States is a party. That has language about developed countries taking the lead and pursuing progressive
contributions to reducing emissions. I don’t know that this
language (in the Paris Agreement) is so revolutionary that
it’s significantly different from what we’ve had before except
that it does express some kind of no backsliding principle,
that you can’t do worse than you were doing before.
David Titley: Hari was in Paris, so she can comment
on the effect of the NGOs. What I saw in Copenhagen,
Cancun, and Durban was that many of the fights start
up well before and the fights are for access, about what is
the color of your ID badge that gets you into the building and where in the building you can go, how much you
can get in, literally, real-time access to U.S. Special Envoy
for Climate Change Todd Stern or Todd Stern’s assistant.
NGOs worked very hard to get their people placed so
that they could have that kind of access in addition to all
the media things that the people do. That’s what I saw at
previous COPs.
The question as to whether the Paris Agreement is a step
forward or a step backward—that’s interesting. The general
public’s interest in climate is so low. I’m not sure people
will remember Paris except those who work on it here. A
few months from now, most people will be on to American Idol last season or whatever the things are that people
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worry about nowadays. I would say that the agreement is
a net positive. Many people were worried that it was going
to be another disaster like Copenhagen or worse, and it
wasn’t. At least there’s some degree of international will to
tackle the problem. It’s necessary, but far from sufficient.
I said earlier that now is when the hard work begins and
many people have used similar phraseology, but at least this
is a better conversation to have than, “We can’t even agree
if the climate is changing, let alone what to do about it.” Or
an approach of every person for themselves, the argument
that “Why should America do anything when X isn’t going
to do anything?” I am a glass-half-full person. Is the Paris
Agreement everything? No. Is it for all the things we’ve
talked about here? It is. It’s interesting that one person says
we’re too gloom-and-doom and then the next person says
we’re too Pollyannish.
Hari Osofsky: A few questions were directed at me
throughout. I’ll try to address them. On the BINGO
question, there are nine constituency groups under the
UNFCCC. The BINGO constituency group is one of the
nine. There are also environmental NGOs, trade union
NGOs, indigenous peoples’ organizations, local government and municipal authorities, research-oriented and
independent organizations, youth NGOs, faith-based
NGOs, gender-based NGOs.37 These constituency groups
have official points during the negotiations when they are
allowed to present. For example, at the very end of the
final night, after all the state parties had spoken at about
midnight, they let each of the constituency groups make
a statement. They came up with common statements, but
one of the more interesting moments was when the youth
NGOs started a chant and the women representing them
stood up and said what a disaster the agreement was. They
can be quite colorful.
There were a lot of complaints about access from civil
society groups. Each day, the constituency groups had a
briefing. There were points where they got to officially
meet with Christiana Figueres, executive secretary of the
UNFCCC, and Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, the former president
of the COP. During those meetings, one of the complaints
concerned access. In response to those complaints, in one
of the Comité de Paris meetings, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal,
Minister of the Environment of Peru in addition to the former president of the COP, used his floor time to represent
some of those concerns. In doing so, he said, “I promised
them I would convey their concerns.” So, sometimes it gets
conveyed on the floor in a formal way. There were various
formal ways constituency groups could convey things.
However, most of what happened that was important
wasn’t done in formal moments; it was done through back
channels. Representatives of business groups may be on
national delegations, so they had influence that way. It’s
also about their personal contacts to people who were on
37. UNFCCC, Non-Governmental Organization Constituencies, https://
unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_
2011_english.pdf.
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the delegations; they were passing notes into the delegations
for the negotiations. A lot of it was happening informally.
The second question is the tricky part: whether the
Paris Agreement is exceeding the president’s authority
to make an agreement without the advice and consent of
the Senate. My answer is no. The agreement was carefully
designed not to exceed that authority. The State Department lawyers and negotiators put a great deal of effort into
making sure that the Paris Agreement could be treated as
an executive agreement under domestic law. That’s part
of why there was a crisis at the very end where, all week,
the agreement read “should” and then it read “shall.” The
United States couldn’t agree to the language if it said
“shall” because the State Department lawyers knew they
couldn’t get it through.
All that language around emissions targets is soft. It’s
intentionally soft so that it doesn’t exceed current U.S.
commitments. Remember, any treaty we join, we can also
unjoin. Even if we become party to the Paris Agreement,
that doesn’t mean we cannot later be not party to the agreement. Future administrations aren’t bound to maintain the
same treaty obligations; they can withdraw from treaties
under their terms. I certainly hope that isn’t the outcome
with respect to the Paris Agreement.
Finally, on the question of the agreement being a victim of its success, I largely agree with everybody else on
this point. I think this was so much more successful than
what has happened for many years. That’s why I made the
reference to the hundred yards not being very fast. It is
a moment that we can celebrate, when you finally make
progress at an international level that previously seemed so
impossible. A lot of people talked in their speeches about
the progress it represented for multilateralism. I think that’s
right. It was an exciting moment in multilateralism. They
had almost 200 countries standing up and saying: We support this. It doesn’t reflect what we want completely, but
there’s enough there and we will compromise.
One thing that was really interesting was when the president of the COP, Laurent Fabius, said, as they moved into
the final set of negotiations, “We’re going to have an indaba
of solutions.” An indaba is a concept that came out of the
Durban COP, drawing from Zulu and Xhosa traditions,
and involves creating a forum in which all views are represented with a focus on seeking common ground. Numerous indaba were held during the Paris COP to try to move
the negotiations forward on various key issues. But for
the final indaba of solutions, President Fabius told negotiators that they were no longer allowed to state positions;
they were only allowed to propose compromises. President
Fabius worked hard to get the countries to move beyond
stating the same concerns over and over again, and to focus
on getting to an agreement.
Is the Paris Agreement enough? Of course not. Is there
a huge gap? Yes. Is this a major problem that there’s a
huge gap? Of course. And is it enough on the local radar
screen? No. If you just look at Facebook as a barometer
of this, the extent to which terrorist attacks, for example,
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galvanize national attention, or the economy galvanizes
national attention, is way above the climate change issue.
Could we end up electing a climate denier as president in
this country? Yes, because people for the most part won’t
be voting on that. Even if they believe climate change is
real, that might or might not be the issue that determines
their vote.
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So, there’s a huge set of barriers and problems and
struggles, but what’s exciting is that for the first time since
the UNFCCC was created, we have significant progress
at the international legal level, and we have the United
States willing to join in. To me, that is something we can
celebrate even as we struggle with all of the implementation details.

